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RESUMEN 
El objetivo de esta tesis es identificar y analizar nuevos factores, no investigados 
previamente por la literatura contable, que incentiven la revelación voluntaria de 
información. Puesto que las consecuencias de revelar información varían en función del 
entorno en el que dicha información es revelada, el presente análisis se realizará desde dos 
perspectivas distintas: revelar información al mercado en general y compartir información 
con socios comerciales. En el primer capítulo exploramos como la propensión a revelar 
información al mercado es influenciada por la forma en que otras organizaciones han 
revelado información en el pasado. De esta forma, nuestros resultados muestran que las 
firmas imitan a otras empresas el mismo hecho de revelar la información 
independientemente del contenido, pero en función de dos factores: la incertidumbre y la 
lucha por mantener su posición competitiva en el mercado. Además, la segunda razón 
parece ser dominante. En el segundo capítulo, se analiza el flujo interno de información 
durante negociaciones entre socios comerciales. Específicamente exploramos como las 
penalizaciones por acuerdos tardíos modifican la usualmente asumida relación negativa 
entre el poder de negociación de los socios comerciales y su disposición a compartir 
información. Nuestros resultados soportan la idea de que la interacción entre las 
penalizaciones por acuerdos tardíos y el poder de negociación de los socios comerciales 
genera incentivos que son capaces de disminuir, al menos en cierto grado, el efecto 
negativo del poder de negociación sobre la disposición a dar información. 
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ABSTRACT 
The global motivation for this work is the identification and analysis of unexplored factors 
driving firm’s voluntary disclosure of strategic information. Since the motivation and 
consequences of disclosing information change according to the disclosure environment, 
we conduct our analysis from two different perspectives: disclosing information to markets 
and sharing information internally with commercial partners. In the first essay we explore 
how firms’ propensity to disclose information to the market is influenced by the previous 
disclosing behavior of other players in the market. Our results show that firms imitate their 
peers both to deal with uncertainty as well as for competitive reasons. Nevertheless, 
however, the second reason tends to be dominant. In the second essay, we analyze the 
internal information flow during negotiations between commercial partners. Specifically, 
we explore how penalties for delay influence the usually found negative relation between 
traders’ bargaining power and their willingness to share accounting information during 
negotiations. Our results support our main thesis, and we conclude that the interaction 
between the penalizations for delay and the bargaining power are able to create, at least to 
some extent, incentives to diminish the negative effects of bargaining power over 
information sharing. 
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Introduction 
This work is presented by Mr. Gilberto Márquez Illescas as part of the requirements to 
obtain the PhD degree in Business Economics and Quantitative Methods at the Business 
Department of the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.  It was conducted under the 
supervision of the Professors Dr. Susana Gago Rodríguez and Dr. Manuel Núñez Nickel. 
The global motivation for this work is the identification and analysis of unexplored factors 
driving firm’s voluntary disclosure of strategic information. Disclosing information 
involves a trade-off which positive and negative effects for disclosing firms will depend on 
the disclosure context. When information is disclosed directly to markets, firms revealing 
information send a positive signal and differentiate from competitors, however, rival 
organizations could use this information to compete more aggressively. On the contrary, 
when information is shared internally with commercial partners (i.e. supply chain partners), 
the pros and cons of sharing information are different. On one hand, sharing information is 
likely to enhance the overall coordination and performance of the supply chain, but at the 
same time, sharing this information is likely to deteriorate the bargaining power of 
disclosers. According to these notions, even when the revelation of strategic information is 
important both at the market and individual firm level, the decision of individual firms of 
revealing information is not straightforward. In this work, we analyze two factors pushing 
firms to disclose in different contexts. In a market context, we use an archival methodology 
to explore how the disclosure actions of peers affect the firm’s voluntary disclosure and on 
an internal context (supply chain context) we use an experimental approach to analyze how 
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the existence of penalties due to late agreements affect firm’s propensity to share 
information with commercial partners.  
In the first chapter, we analyze how the disclosing behavior of organizations is influenced 
by the previous disclosing behavior of other players in the market. To do this, we use a 
double-driver theoretical approach in order to disentangle two main drivers of imitation: 
uncertainty and competition. The empirical approach of this first chapter is archival, using 
as an empirical setting the Spanish newspaper industry from 1966 to 1992. We provide 
evidence that imitation may arise regardless if the content of the information disclosed 
represent good or bad news to the disclosing firm. Our results show that even when mimic 
patterns are used by firms both, as a mechanism to deal with uncertainty and as a tool to 
compete in the market, the second effect tends to be dominant. These findings provide a 
new insight regarding the disclosure of information. For instance, if a regulator pretends to 
incentive the voluntary disclosure, the actions needed may be different depending on the 
level of competition. If competition is strong, it may suffice to motivate one firm in order to 
generate a positive disclosure trend in the industry.   On the contrary, if competition is very 
low, a regulator may try to motivate a market leader (a highly informed organization) to 
disclose in order to generate a positive effect in the industry. 
In the second chapter, we analyze how firms’ willingness to share information is affected 
by their bargaining power when a negotiation between commercial partners takes place in a 
setting where penalties for late agreements are positive. We claim that these penalties for 
delay interact with the bargaining power in order to generate impatience in most powerful 
traders, increasing their willingness to share information.  To test this notion we conducted 
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an experiment with undergraduate students from a large Spanish University. We provide 
evidence that, at some extent, in bargaining settings where time is valuable for traders, most 
powerful buyers are likely to show a higher willingness to share information. The 
implications of this finding is that when supply chain partners need to coordinate is that 
more powerful partners are likely to show a more cooperative bargaining approach in 
supply chains competing in more disputed or dynamic markets, in other words, where the 
benefits of cooperation would be higher. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
EXPERTS OR RIVALS: MIMICRY AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE1 
ABSTRACT 
We explore how the disclosing behavior of a particular firm is influenced by the previous 
disclosing behavior of other players in the market. Regardless of the content of the 
information, we analyze the relative importance of two different motivations to imitate: 
uncertainty and competition. We disentangle these two possibilities, identifying their 
relative influence on the disclosing behavior of firms in the newspaper industry in Spain 
during the period 1966-1993. Our results show that uncertainty pushes firms to follow the 
actions of more informed organizations. Nevertheless, this effect loses relevance as 
competition is considered. Based on these results, we conclude that mimic patterns are used 
by firms both, as a mechanism to deal with uncertainty and as a tool to compete in the 
market.  
Keywords: Disclosure, Imitation, uncertainty, competition, newspapers. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 This article is co-authored by Dr. Manuel Cano Rodríguez. In the same vein, we thank participants and 
referees of the 2013 Raymond Konopka Annual Workshop in Management Accounting and Accounting 
History, Internal Seminar Series of Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, the 2013 European Accounting 
Association Annual Conference and the 2013 American Accounting Association Annual Conference for their 
helpful comments. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Voluntary disclosure promotes an efficient market’s allocation of resources by diminishing 
the information asymmetries between firms and stakeholders (Healy and Palepu 2001).  
This aspect makes the study of any unexplored factor driving firm’s voluntary disclosure to 
be relevant. In this work, we propose that imitation is likely to be considered among these 
factors. That is, we explore the existence of behavioral patterns where firms disclose non-
financial information mainly because other firms of reference have done it before.  
The influence of other organizations’ past actions on firm’s disclosure of non-financial 
information is a topic that has been scarcely reviewed by empirical accounting literature. 
To our knowledge, only three papers deal directly with this issue, all of them focused on 
financial information. Following the economic theories of herding, Brown, Gordon and 
Wermers (2006) provide evidence of intra-industry herding behavior in CAPEX 
disclosures. In the same manner, Tse and Tucker (2009) find that the disclosure of negative 
income warnings is influenced by the disclosure behavior of other peer firms in the market. 
On the other hand, Aerts, Cormier and Magnan (2005) depart from this economic 
perspective and test the existence of mimetic patterns on disclosure of corporate 
environmental expenses following an institutional approach, in which imitation is 
motivated exclusively by social legitimacy reasons. In other words, they explore a sort of 
status-seeking imitation. Three additional papers provide complementary evidence about 
the role of imitation on firms’ disclosure decisions. Botosan and Harris (2000) include the 
mimetic behavior as a control variable when testing the influence of competition of firm’s 
disclosure behavior. In a similar manner, Houston, Lev and Tucker (2006) uses imitation as 
CHAPTER I. Experts or rivals: mimicry and voluntary disclosure  
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a control variable in order to analyze the factors behind earnings guidance. Finally, Lu and 
Tucker (2012) incorporate mimetic behavior as a control variable in their model to test the 
relation between earnings management and the revelation of non-financial information 
(strategic plans). This last paper is the only one considering the imitation of non-financial 
disclosures. However, the imitation of non-financial disclosures is not supported by the 
empirical findings. Given the secondary role of imitation in these last three papers, the 
authors do not provide further theoretical explanations for this effect. The rest of 
accounting papers developing the imitation branch of accounting literature, do not analyze 
the imitation among firms in the industry, but the herding behavior among other agents in 
the market (such as securities traders and advisers) that arise after the voluntary disclosure 
performed by firms (e.g. Arya, Glover, Mittendorf and Narayanamoorthy 2005; Arya and 
Mittendorf 2005; Dye and Sridhar 1995; Mensah and Yang 2008).   
In this work, we extend Brown et al. (2006), Aerts et al. (2005) and Tse and Tucker (200), 
analyzing the influence that previous disclosures of reference firms have on the current 
voluntary disclosure of a particular firm. However, three differences may be remarked. 
Firstly, our work explores the imitation of the action of disclosure, regardless of whether 
the content of the information represent good or bad news for the firms. Secondly, and 
more important, instead of using a single theoretical perspective (either economic or 
organizational) we use a double factor approach based on a recent framework provided by 
Lieberman and Asaba (2006). We do not test the mere existence of an imitation pattern in 
disclosure but we analyze and test the relative importance of two different factors 
motivating firms’ imitation: the firm’s specific disclosure uncertainty (e.g. Dimaggio and 
Powell 1983; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch 1992; Bikhchandani  Hirshleifer and 
CHAPTER I. Experts or rivals: mimicry and voluntary disclosure  
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Welch 1998; Henisz and Delios 2001) and its competitive environment (e.g. Chen and 
McMillan 1992; Knickerbocker 1973). Thirdly, we conduct our work using of non-
financial information. 
The distinction between the two mentioned drivers of imitation is important because it 
would determine what organizations will be used as role model. In the case of uncertainty, 
firms will replicate the actions of other organizations perceived to be more experienced. We 
refer to this first type of imitation as Experience-based. On the contrary, when imitation is 
driven by competition, firms may find optimal to follow the actions of their closer rivals in 
order to maintain their relative competitive position in the market. We refer to this second 
type of imitation as Rivalry-based. The existence and magnitude of these two effects will 
clarify what the overall firm’s motivation to mimic what other organizations have 
previously done in terms of disclosure is.  
We empirically test these ideas using a panel data logit model to estimate the probability of 
voluntary disclosure as a function of the previous disclosure behavior (in relation to the 
same items) of expert and rival organizations operating in the same sector. We used as 
empirical setting the newspaper industry in Spain over the period 1966-1993, examining 
specifically the firms’ decision of disclosing (or not) the number of newspapers sold 
(circulation figure). Within this industry, this figure is considered as strategic information 
for the organizations since its divulgation may have two potential (and opposed) 
implications on firm’s performance. Firstly, it significantly affects the firm´s operating 
income by signaling the clients the quality of the newspapers. Secondly, rivals can use this 
information in order to replicate the successful features of the disclosing firm. 
CHAPTER I. Experts or rivals: mimicry and voluntary disclosure  
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The main contribution of this work relies on its double factor approach for explaining the 
firm’s motivations to imitate other agent’s disclosure actions, regardless of the “sign” of the 
information. The use of this framework allows us to show empirically that the imitation of 
non-financial information disclosure actions may be driven not only by uncertainty (as 
assumed by most of herding accounting literature) but also by competitive reasons. 
Moreover, we are also able to disentangle the relative importance of these two drivers. This 
approach has not been used to analyze the mimicry of disclosure patterns. Our work then, 
not just identify imitation as a driver of disclosure, but it offers both theoretically and 
empirically an explanation of the reasons behind firms’ decisions to follow the behavior of 
other organizations.  As a secondary contribution, we provide some empirical evidence of 
imitation of non-financial disclosures.  
The paper is structured in the following way. In the next section, we explain in detail the 
concepts of Experience-based and Rivalry-based imitation effects and formulate a set of 
hypotheses for further testing. The third section explains the methodology, sample and 
variables used in order to perform the empirical testing. Section four describes the results 
and the final section includes some conclusions and directions for future research. 
 
II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Expertise-based imitation  
When the outcomes of an action are not clear, firms may find optimal to mimic the 
disclosure behavior of other agents that they perceive as better informed or “expert” 
organizations (Lieberman and Asaba 2006). Traditionally, it is considered that disclosing 
CHAPTER I. Experts or rivals: mimicry and voluntary disclosure  
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firms differentiate themselves from closer rival firms since they transmit a positive signal to 
its clients. This positive signal is expected to have an upward effect on profits (Grossman 
1981; Milgrom 1981). On the other hand, simultaneously to this positive effect, disclosure 
may also represent a threat for the revealing firm’s performance since rivals could use this 
information to compete more aggressively (Verrechia 1983). Hence, from an elementary 
perspective, a firm’s voluntary decision of revealing strategic information to the market 
might depend on the firm’s capacity to estimate the net outcome of these two contrary 
effects. If agents were in possession of the necessary elements to accurately estimate the 
relative strength of these two effects, then, firm’s disclosure decisions would be totally 
autonomous. However, if this was not the case, firms could need to rely on alternative 
mechanisms to select the best course of action for the organization. One of these 
mechanisms is looking at the disclosure behavior of other agents in the market perceived as 
having better information regarding the potential consequences of revealing information. It 
is important to remark that in this work we do not focus in situations where information’s 
positive effect is linked to the delivery of good news, or in situations where imitation 
comes from the firm’s opportunistic behavior of jumping into a bandwagon of “bad-news” 
disclosures. In other words, we do not study an imitation effect triggered by the sign of the 
information, but to the action of disclosing per se. For instance, regardless of the content of 
the information, firms may obtain benefits from disclosing if this action is seen by 
customers as a signal of the firm’s credibility.  
More interesting perhaps, is the notion that the mechanism modeling firms’ perception of 
other players’ superior expertise is not unique. A firm can be perceived as having superior 
expertise, for instance, as indicated by the herding and information cascades research, 
CHAPTER I. Experts or rivals: mimicry and voluntary disclosure  
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because it has more experience in the market or because it is considered a sort of fashion 
leader that have been already followed by other organizations (Bikhchandani et al. 1992; 
Bikhchandani et al. 1998). Alternatively, this higher status may come from institutional 
factors such as size or salient performance (Haunschild and Miner 1997; Haveman, 1993) 
or even industry legitimation (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). For the purposes of this work, 
we consider two specific factors that confer firms a high expertise status in revealing 
information: size and age. Larger firms have more resources that allow them to take more 
“informed” decisions (e.g. Gimeno, Hoskisson, Beal and Wan 2005). Older firms are more 
likely to know the market and evaluate in a better way the consequences of disclosure. 
Then, if an Expertise-based imitation prevails on a given setting, the number of large (old) 
firms revealing information to the market in the past must be positively related with the 
adoption of this same practice by any given individual firm at present time. It is noteworthy 
that this reasoning implies that if a firm with high experience at disclosing actually did so 
in previous periods, then disclosing is likely to be considered as a practice with positive (or 
at least not negative) outcomes for the firms. Otherwise, expert firms would not be 
disclosing anymore. These notions lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The number of large (old) firms revealing information in the 
past exerts an increment on the probability that an individual firm has the same 
behavior in the present.  
On the other hand, as the uncertainty associated with the potential consequences of 
disclosing information becomes higher, an organization’s capability to make autonomous 
decisions decreases, and hence, its incentives to mimic the actions of expert players (which 
CHAPTER I. Experts or rivals: mimicry and voluntary disclosure  
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are supposed to elaborate more accurate assessments given their experience) rises up.  
Hence, in settings where an Expertise-based imitation effect is observed, this effect should 
be more salient as the degree of this specific type of uncertainty faced by firms gets higher. 
Based on this argument, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The specific uncertainty faced by firms strengthens the effect of 
an Expertise-based imitation pattern over the probability of voluntary disclosure. 
  
Rivalry-Based Imitation  
Another possibility, regardless of the factor mentioned above, is that rival organizations 
imitate the disclosure behavior of each other in order to maintain their relative competitive 
position in the market (Lieberman and Asaba 2006). When the action of revealing information, 
per se, provides firms with competitive advantage, firms may perceive rival organizations’ 
disclosures as a threat for their competitive position and, in order to neutralize this menace, firms 
may follow their competitors’ actions and disclose too.  In such situation, following rivals’ actions 
act as a mechanism for keeping a firm’s market relative competitive position constant 
(Knickerbocker 1973). In the same sense, if most of firms decide to disclose, the possibility 
to face a non-disclosing firm decreases and a kind of tacit collusion regarding the revelation 
of information is likely to appear (Porter 1979). As an example, one might think about a 
company identifying the best option for its marketing campaign in written media. In order 
to decide what publication is more convenient for its purposes, this firm needs to have 
quantitative and qualitative information about the audience of newspapers, magazines, etc. 
Each firm in this industry can proportionate its own figures but due to the existence of 
information asymmetries, this information is unlikely to be considered as reliable (media 
CHAPTER I. Experts or rivals: mimicry and voluntary disclosure  
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firms have important incentives to deceive) for optimal decision making. In such a context, 
a firm able to show credible (e.g. audited) information about its audience is likely to have a 
competitive advantage due to a rise on its credibility (independently of whether the 
information is good or bad). The theory behind the Rivalry-Based imitation effect suggests 
that, in order to avoid a change in their relative competitive position, rival firms will 
disclose similar information in order to keep their status quo in the market. 
In other words, disclosure may help organizations to preserve their relative competitive 
position and stabilize the competitive environment by neutralizing the effects of the 
disclosure actions performed by rival firms. These ideas indicate that firms might not 
disclose following up what they consider as “expert players” but they also might disclose if 
their direct competitors do so. Different from the Expertise-based imitation where imitation 
is based on a specific feature of the firms disclosing information (experience or size), 
Rivalry-based imitation is then, based on the mere existence of rival firms revealing 
information. According to these previous concepts, if Rivalry-based imitation prevails on a 
given setting, the existence competitors disclosing information in the past should have a 
positive influence the adoption of this practice by a given individual firm in the present. 
These notions allow us to formulate the next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The number of prior competitors disclosing information exerts 
an increment on the probability that an individual firm shows the same behavior in 
the present.  
Since, as mentioned above, Rivalry-based imitation is used by organizations as a tool to 
deal with competition (Semadeni and Anderson 2010), the strength of this type of imitation 
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effect is likely to vary according with the level of competition faced by the firms. If the 
competition faced by firms is low, firms have low incentives to imitate because the actions 
of their rivals do not represent a threat for its status quo. On the contrary, when the market 
is highly competitive, not following the actions of the competitors may induce high 
changes in the status quo of the firms. In other words, if a Rivalry-based imitation effect 
exists in a given setting, the intensity of this effect should be higher as the competition in 
the market intensifies. These arguments motivate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The intensity of competition increases the effect of a Rivalry-based 
imitation pattern over the probability of voluntary disclosure. 
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
Research setting 
We empirically test our set of hypotheses using as empirical setting the newspaper industry 
in Spain during the period 1966-1993. We consider important to highlight two advantages 
of using this specific empirical setting for testing voluntary disclosure issues. First, firms 
reveal the circulation number through a government agency known as OJD (Oficina de 
Justificación de la Difusión) and this organism is the only voluntary and verifiable 
mechanism used by the organizations in the Spanish Newspaper industry to release 
circulation figures2. Hence, for empirical purposes the figures are “audited” and as such, the 
empirical results obtained from this data are reasonably isolated from noisy issues derived 
                                                          
2
 OJD charges a fee (% of sales) to newspapers in order to certify and publish their information. Given the 
amount of this fee, we consider that it does not influence the firm’s decision of disclosing information.   
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from information asymmetries among clients and newspapers (e.g. cheap talking)3. Second, 
the data is free from the effects of stock market and mandatory disclosure since during the 
whole analyzed period, on one hand, all the firms in the sample were privately owned and 
on the other, firms were not obligated to disclose this information neither by law nor by any 
government institution. Regarding the time span, it was strategically chosen in order to 
cover since the year in which the OJD was founded (1966) till the last year in which all 
firms were privately owned (1992).  
In this empirical setting, two different types of firms coexist. On one hand, there is a group 
of small newspapers whose coverage is local and faces very low direct competition. We 
refer to these organizations as Local newspapers. On the other hand, there is a group of 
large newspapers which circulation covers the whole Spanish market. Different from the 
Local newspapers, these organizations directly compete against each other. Given its larger 
geographical area of influence and resources, these newspapers are the natural leaders in 
the market. We refer to this type of firms as National newspapers.  
Within this setting, we specifically analyze the firm’s decision of whether or not disclosing 
the information of the number of daily issues sold (or daily circulation figure). In the 
newspaper industry, the divulgation of this figure is considered a highly strategic decision 
due to its potential implications on performance. On one hand, the circulation figure 
indicates the quality of the organizations to their potential advertising customers in terms of 
transparency and diffusion and as a result, it potentially affects a substantial portion of the 
firm’s income4. In other words, the circulation figure of a newspaper is closed linked with 
                                                          
3
 This feature is important because voluntary disclosure mitigates the misallocation of resources in the 
markets as long as it is credible (Healy and Palepu 2001). 
4
 Which accounts for around 80% of the industry’s income (Kirchhoff 2009). 
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the audience that it can reach, and hence, this figure determines the newspaper 
attractiveness to the eyes of advertising customers5. On the other hand, by revealing this 
figure, an organization is directly providing its competitors with an input to estimate its 
dimension, revenues and cost functions, as well as highlighting its competitive advantages, 
which may intensify the competition in the industry if rival firms take advantage of it.  
 
Data 
The collected data includes information of 227 firms (15 National and 212 Local) during 
the period 1966-1993 and indicates, on a quarterly basis, whether the firm   disclosed or not 
its circulation figure to the OJD. The database also includes qualitative information of the 
firms such as their geographic location, coverage (if regional or national), year of 
foundation, etc. The data describing the newspapers’ disclosure behavior was obtained 
directly from the OJD records. The rest of the information was calculated based on the 
records from the Registry of Journalistic Firms and the General Mass Media Guide. To 
perform our analysis we eliminated from the database the observations belonging to 
specific content newspapers (sports, social, etc.) since this type of organizations in most 
cases do not have direct competitors on their relevant markets, which impedes to test for a 
Rivalry-based imitation effect. After this deletion, our final sample contained 868 quarter-
firm observations for National newspapers and 11,494 quarter-firm observations for Local 
newspapers. 
 
 
                                                          
5
 In addition, given the time span chosen, there is no influence of on-line advertising that potentially could 
significantly diminish the influence of the circulation figure on income generation. 
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Model Specification 
In order to test our hypotheses, we ran two different sets of models, one for each type of 
firms. For Local newspapers we do test only the Expetise-based imitation effect since the 
competition among this type of firms is insignificant. On the contrary, in the case of 
National Newspapers, we test both imitation effects simultaneously.  
All models follow a fixed effects panel data logit6 specification as depicted in Equation 1. 
 
                                     (   )   (     |   )  
   (   
  )
     (   
  )
                         (1)                               
 
In Equation 1,  (   ) accounts for the probability to observe the firm i disclosing 
information at time t as a function of a set of covariates      that contains three groups of 
variables: (1) variables measuring our two theoretical imitation effects, (2) the drivers of 
imitation (uncertainty and intensity of competition) and (3) variables controlling for 
newspapers’ propensity to disclose.  
 
Variables 
Variables measuring imitation effects 
In the case of Local Newspapers, we use two variables to measure the Expertise-based 
Imitation Effect. The variable LExpertiseSize accounts for the number of national 
newspapers disclosing information in the period t-1.  In a similar fashion, we define the 
                                                          
6 In order to ensure that the chosen econometric methodology matches our empirical setting, we conducted a 
Hausman test (StataCorp 2011). The results indicate that it is safe to use a fixed-effects model.  
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variable LExpertiseAge as the number of local newspapers older than 50 years disclosing 
information in the period t-1.   
On the other hand, in the case of National newspapers, the Experience-based imitation is 
measure only through the variable NExpertiseAge, which accounts for the number of 
national newspapers older than 50 years disclosing information in the period t-17. We do 
not include a variable measuring the expertise of Local newspapers since larger firms are 
unlikely to imitate smaller firms (Gilbert and Lieberman 1987). In a similar fashion, we test 
the Rivalry-Based Imitation effect (H3) with the variable NRivalry, which measures the 
number of national newspapers disclosing information in the period t-1. 
 
Variables measuring drivers of imitation 
In accordance with the theoretical notions presented, we use the uncertainty about the 
consequences of disclosing information as a driver of imitation. Firms new to a certain 
action are unlikely to have a stock of knowledge to evaluate the consequences of that action 
(Henisz and Delios 2001). According to these ideas, the more experience a firm has in 
disclosing information, the more its understanding of the benefits and costs of doing so, and 
therefore, the more its expertise and the less uncertainty it will perceive about the outcomes 
linked to revealing information. With this in mind, we define the variable Uncertainty for 
the firm i at time t, as the negative of the total number of periods in which it has released 
information from time t=0 to time t-18. In this way, if a newspaper has never released 
                                                          
7 We checked the robustness of the results obtained for the Expertise-Based Imitation using different time 
thresholds (i.e. 5, 10, 20, 30 and 40 years) for the variables LExpertiseAge and NExpetiseAge. We did not find 
any significant change in our results neither for Local or National newspapers.  
8
 For newspapers founded after 1966, t=0 indicates the firm’s foundation date while for firms founded before 
1966, this variable includes all their accumulative disclosures from 1966 to time t-1. Given that our database 
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information in the past (maximum uncertainty), the variable would take a value of cero. As 
the disclosing history of a firm increases, the value of the variable will decrease indicating 
that the uncertainty faced by that firm is smaller. In addition to this specific uncertainty 
measure, we use the variable Age as a measure of the general uncertainty of firms. Older 
firms are expected to know more about the market and hence, have a lower uncertainty. We 
used these two variables in a cross product with the Expertise-based imitation variables in 
the models of Local and National newspapers to test H2.  
On the other hand, we calculated the variable Market Concentration in order to 
approximate the notion of intensity of competition. This measure is a concentration index 
calculated at period t as the logarithm of the total number of potential readers (older than 
16) in Spain at time t divided by the total number of National newspapers established at the 
same period t. This measure provides an idea of the market concentration at any time t. 
Higher (lower) values of this variable indicate higher (lower) market concentration and 
hence, lower (higher) intensity of competition. We used this measure as a cross product 
with NRivalry to test H4.  
Variables controlling for newspapers’ propensity to disclose 
We included control variables potentially related with the firm’s natural propensity of 
disclosure. These variables are common to all models. Firstly, we controlled for the firm’s 
disclosure behavior in previous period (period t-1) by including a variable called Inertia. 
This measure accounts for the possibility that firms just do what they did in the previous 
period instead of imitating the behavior of other agents. In the same vein, in order to control 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
contains all the information published by the OJD since the beginning of its operations (1966), we have all the 
disclosing history for these firms. 
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for the general state of the economy, we included the variable LogGNP, which accounts for 
the logarithm of the Spanish Gross National Product (in billions of pesetas). Firm’s 
performance is other factor that could modulate the disclosing behavior since it works as a 
signaling mechanism where firms with relatively good news disclose while other forms do 
not (e.g. Miller 2002). We used a survival model to approximate this concept by the hazard 
rate of failure (risk of bankruptcy) for every firm-period. Using these calculations, we 
created the variable Performance, which accounts for the yearly average hazard rate 
measure for each firm. Likewise, we included the variable Subsidy in order to control for 
the introduction of a subsidy based on diffusion that could modify the firm’s incentives to 
disclose information through the OJD. Since this subsidy started to work in 1984, we gave 
this variable the value of 0 for the observations corresponding to periods before 1984, and 1 
for the periods after the introduction of the subsidy. Finally, looking forward to control for 
variations in disclosure coming from the change in the political-market conditions we 
included the variable Dictatorship, which takes a value of one and zero for observations 
before and after the dictatorship period in Spain, respectively. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 displays means, standard deviations and range of the main variables described in 
the previous section. Panel A refers to National newspapers while Panel B provides the 
statistics related with Local newspapers. Panel A shows that the average number of rival 
organizations (NRivalry) disclosing information is slightly higher than six. From these 
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competitors, in average, only two were considered as “old” according with our definition 
(NExpetiseAge). On the other hand, the range of the firms’ disclosing experience 
(Uncertainty) is large, going from newspapers with a high experience (105 periods) to 
organizations for which disclosing information is totally a new practice. In average, firms 
have a disclosing experience of 38 periods. In the same manner, the data includes both, 
recently founded and very old newspapers (Age). Regarding the competition (Market 
Concentration), it goes from a minimum of 0.98 to a maximum of 1.68, which indicates 
that during some periods the competition was more intense than in others.  
Panel B shows the statistic summary of Local newspapers. This type of firms observed an 
average of 7 National firms (LExpertiseSize) and 26 Local organizations considered as old 
(LExpertiseAge) disclosing information on each period. On the other hand, the specific 
uncertainty faced by Local firms (Uncertainty), in average seems to be higher than in the 
case of National newspapers. Similarly, according to the average age (Age), Local 
organizations are younger than National firms.  This might indicate that in average, 
National firms are more experienced in disclosing information and have a deeper 
knowledge of the market than Local firms. This fact may suggest that National 
organizations may have a superior performance and a lower bankruptcy probability. In this 
regard, the variable Performance indicates that in fact, the performance of National 
newspapers is slightly better than the one of Local firms. Finally, the disclosing inertia 
(Inertia) seems to be higher in the case of National newspapers. 
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Table 2 depicts the pairwise correlation coefficients (Pearson and Spearman) among the set 
of variables defined in the previous section. Panel A shows the correlations corresponding 
to the National newspapers group. There is a high correlation between the variable Uncer 
and the variables Age (-0.50) and Market Concentration (-0.56). In the former case, the 
correlation indicates that older firms tend to release more information. This result suggests 
that older firms have a better understanding of the market and perhaps associate disclosure 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
National Rivalry 868 6.18 1.60 0.00 9.00
National Expertise Age 868 2.85 0.84 0.00 5.00
Uncertainty 868 -38.56 29.29 -105.00 0.00
Age 868 51.67 32.02 0.00 112.83
Market Concentration 868 1.25 0.19 0.98 1.68
Inertia 860 0.87 0.34 0.00 1.00
LogGNP 868 10.51 0.23 9.99 10.85
Performance 868 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.73
Subsidy 868 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Dictatorship 868 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
National Expertise Size 11494 6.93 1.67 0.00 10.00
Local Expertise Age 11494 26.39 9.21 0.00 45.00
Uncertainty 11494 -19.68 27.88 -109.00 0.00
Age 11494 46.76 35.16 0.00 191.66
Inertia 11375 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
LogGNP 11494 10.51 0.24 9.99 10.85
Performance 11494 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.94
Subsidy 11494 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
Dictatorship 11494 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
Table 1 presents means, standard deviations, minimums and maximums. Panel A shows these statistics for National
newspapers and Panel B for Local newspapers. National Rivalry for any national firm i is the number of rival
national newspapers (different from i ) disclosing information in the period t-1. National Expertise Age for any
national firm i is the number of national firms older than 50 years (different from i ) disclosing information a time t-1.
National Expertise Size for any local firm i is the number of national firms older than 50 years disclosing
information a time t-1. Local Expertise Age for any local firm i is the number of local firms older than 50 years
(different from i ) disclosing information a time t-1. Uncertainty is the negative of the accummulated number of
disclosing periods of firm i from time t=0 to to time t-1. Age is the number of years that firms have been in the
market. Market Concentration is the logarithm of the number of potential readers in Spain at time t divided by the
number of national firms in the market at time t. DisInertia is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if firm i disclosed at
time t-1 and 0 otherwise. LogGNP is the logarithm of the gross national product in Spain at time t. Performance  is 
the yearly average hazard rate (i.e. prob. of bankruptcy) measure for firm t. Subsidy is a dummy variable with a value
of 1 if time t occurs after 1984 and 0 otherwise. Dictatorship is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if time t occurs
after the dictatorship period in Spain and 0 otherwise.
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics
PANEL A: National Newspapers
PANEL B: local Newspapers
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with positive outcomes. In the latter case, lower values of the variable Market 
Concentration indicate a more competitive market, for example, due to an increase in the 
number of competitors. If that was the case, since new competitors are likely to have null or 
low experience disclosing information, the variable Uncertainty is likely to increase in 
average.  Regarding the Local newspapers (Panel B), there is a high negative correlation 
between the variables Inertia and Uncertainty (0.67).  This correlation indicates that firms 
having a high inertia in disclosing information tend to disclose more often, leading to an 
increase in the variable Uncertainty. On the other hand, both for the case of National and 
Local newspapers, the control variables LogGNP and Subsidy are correlated with some 
main explanatory variables such as NExpertiseAge, LExpertiseAge and Uncertainty. We do 
not provide a deep explanation for these correlations since even when their magnitude is 
potentially high enough to introduce some estimation problems, as we will show in further 
sections, the inclusion or exclusion of these variables from the models do not modify our 
empirical results. 
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Empirical Testing 
Table 3 depicts, for each type of newspapers, a summary of the way in which we conducted 
the empirical testing of the hypotheses developed in Section 2. Hypotheses 1 and 3 were 
tested with the direct effects of the main imitation variables (LExpertiseAge, 
LExpertiseSize, NExpertiseAge and NRivalry) and Hypotheses 2 y 4 with the interactions 
terms between these variables and their correspondent imitation drivers (Uncertainty, Age 
and Market Concentration).  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 National Rivalry 0.1721 0.0881 -0.0643 -0.5662 0.0959 -0.1742 0.0408 -0.5505 -0.1115
2 National Expertise Age 0.4425 -0.1543 -0.3035 0.3813 -0.0279 0.4709 0.2732 0.296 -0.3663
3 Uncertainty 0.0258 -0.1708 -0.506 -0.5246 -0.2664 -0.7052 0.0871 -0.4912 0.6239
4 Age -0.0574 -0.2956 -0.5048 0.1357 0.134 0.0323 -0.3594 0.0321 -0.0052
5 Market Concentration -0.378 0.3777 -0.562 0.1146 0.0917 0.6082 0.0388 0.6618 -0.3068
6 Inertia 0.2591 0.0981 -0.2153 0.1327 0.1068 0.0256 -0.4014 -0.0498 -0.0149
7 LogGNP 0.1017 0.5685 -0.6994 -0.0007 0.5784 0.0971 0.2759 0.7787 -0.8461
8 Performance -0.0379 0.0882 0.0745 -0.1607 0.0389 -0.5109 0.1304 0.1951 -0.351
9 Subsidy -0.3441 0.2736 -0.5548 0.0125 0.7153 -0.0498 0.729 0.2023 -0.5023
10 Dictatorship -0.1934 -0.3835 0.6186 0.0313 -0.3402 -0.0149 -0.7735 -0.1399 -0.5023
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 National Expertise Size -0.2054 0.0459 0.09 -0.0047 -0.203 -0.0667 -0.5676 -0.0384
2 Local Expertise Age -0.0035 -0.3222 -0.0848 0.1751 0.9793 0.1709 0.7868 -0.8122
3 Uncertainty 0.0069 -0.3843 -0.3789 -0.8672 -0.386 0.6353 -0.2955 0.3499
4 Age 0.0574 -0.0859 -0.3827 0.2906 -0.0446 -0.3703 -0.0859 0.0135
5 Inertia 0.0564 0.1764 -0.6726 0.2675 0.2413 -0.7374 0.1715 -0.2244
6 LogGNP 0.1164 0.9138 -0.432 -0.0268 0.2391 0.1092 0.8036 -0.8508
7 Performance -0.0428 0.1954 0.2535 -0.2947 -0.3914 0.1568 0.0995 -0.1058
8 Subsidy -0.3023 0.8163 -0.3727 -0.073 0.1715 0.7539 0.1557 -0.5579
9 Dictatorship -0.1555 -0.7169 0.3935 0.0115 -0.2244 -0.788 -0.1619 -0.5579
Table 2 presents the Pearson (Spearman) Correlations above (below) the diagonal of the matrix. For Panel A: Correlations ≥|.05| significant at 5%. For Panel B:
Correlations ≥|.03| significant at 5%. National Rivalry for any national firm i is the number of rival national newspapers (different from i ) disclosing information in the
period t-1. National Expertise Age for any national firm i is the number of national firms older than 50 years (different from i ) disclosing information a time t-1.
National Expertise Size for any local firm i is the number of national firms older than 50 years disclosing information a time t-1. Local Expertise Age for any local firm
i is the number of local firms older than 50 years (different from i ) disclosing information a time t-1. Uncertainty is the negative of the accummulated number of
disclosing periods of firm i from time t=0 to to time t-1. Age is the number of years that firms have been in the market. Market Concentration is the logarithm of the
number of potential readers in Spain at time t divided by the number of national firms in the market at time t. DisInertia is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if firm i 
disclosed at time t-1 and 0 otherwise. LogGNP is the logarithm of the gross national product in Spain at time t. Performance is the yearly average hazard rate (i.e.
prob. of bankruptcy) measure for firm t. Subsidy is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if time t occurs after 1984 and 0 otherwise. Dictatorship is a dummy variable
with a value of 1 if time t occurs after the dictatorship period in spain and 0 otherwise.
TABLE 2
Pearson (Spearman) Correlations Below (Above) the Diagonal of the Matrix
PANEL A: National Newspapers
PANEL B: Local Newspapers
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Table 4 shows the results of a group of regressions corresponding to National newspapers. 
Model 1 shows the impact of the control variables on their own. H1 is tested using the 
variable NExpertiseAge and H2 by the interaction between NExpertiseAge and our two 
uncertainty measures (Uncertainty and Age). As shown in all models, there is no individual 
effect of the number of National firms older than 50 years disclosing information in the 
previous period (LEpertiseAge) on the current probability of disclosure of National 
newspapers. Hence, we do not find support for H1 in this case. Nevertheless, a joined 
Expertise-based imitation effect appears with a p-value < 0.1 when both specific 
Variable Hypothesis Table Model Expected Sign
National Expertise Age H1 4 2-5 , 8 +
National Expertise Age x Uncertainty H2 4 3 , 5 , 8 +
National Expertise Age x Age H2 4 4-5 , 8 -
National Rivalry H3 4 6-8 +
National Rivalry x Market Concentration H4 4 7-8 -
Variable Hypothesis Table Model Expected Sign
National Expertise Size H1 5 2-5 , 10-13 +
National Expertise Size x Uncertainty H2 5 3 , 5 , 11 , 13 +
National Expertise Size  x Age H2 5 4-5 , 12-13 -
Local Expertise Age H1 5 6 -9 , 10-13 +
Local Expertise Age  x Uncertainty H2 5 7 , 9 , 11 , 13 +
Local Expertise Age x Age H2 5 8-9 , 12-13 -
Table 3 presents the main variables used for the empirical testing of the hypotheses of the model. Panel A shows the
hypotheses testing for National newspapers. Panel B shows the hypothesis testing for Local newspapers. The first column
indicates the description of the variable. The second, third and fourth columns link the hypothesis , number of model and
expected sign corresponding to the empirical test of each hypotheses. National Rivalry for any national firm i is the
number of rival national newspapers (different from i ) disclosing information in the period t-1. National Expertise Age  for 
any national firm i is the number of national firms older than 50 years (different from i) disclosing information a time t-1.
National Expertise Size for any local firm i is the number of national firms older than 50 years disclosing information a
time t-1. Local Expertise Age for any local firm i is the number of local firms older than 50 years (different from i ) 
disclosing information a time t-1. Uncertainty is the negative of the accummulated number of disclosing periods of firm i 
from time t=0 to to time t-1. Age is the number of years that firms have been in the market. Market Concentration is the
logarithm of the number of potential readers in Spain at time t divided by the number of national firms in the market at time t.
TABLE 3
Expected empirical result for the hypotheses
PANEL A: National Newspapers
PANEL B: Local Newspapers
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uncertainty measures (Uncertainty and age) are considered independently. This result 
indicate that firms propensity to imitate the actions of expert players increases as the firms 
are less familiar with disclosing information, or in other terms, as they face more 
uncertainty. This same result is clearer when we simultaneously analyze both effects in the 
Model 5. This model shows the direct effect of the variable NExpertiseAge as well as its 
interactions with the variables Uncer and Age altogether. In this way, when the effect of the 
specific uncertainty on the imitation effect is considered, both interaction terms between 
LEpertiseAge and Age and Uncer respectively are positive and significant (P-value<0.05). 
These results indicate that when the Expertise-based imitation effect is tested in isolation 
from the Rivalry-based imitation effect H2 is supported. 
Models 6 and 7 test the existence of a Rivalry-Based imitation effect. Model 6 shows that, 
without considering the intensity of competition, the number of competitors disclosing 
information in the previous period (NRivalry) has no effect on the newspapers propensity to 
disclose (P-value>.10). However, Model 7 shows that when the interaction term between 
the variables NRivalry and Market Concentration is included, the main effect of NRivalry is 
positive and highly significant (P-value < 0.001) and the interaction term is negative and 
significant (P-value < 0.001). These findings indicate that the existence of a Rivalry-Based 
imitation depends on the intensity of competition. This outcome supports H3 and H4.  
Model 8 presents a comprehensive picture testing for the two imitation effects at the same 
time. This model repeats the same results by showing the relevance of each imitation effect 
using the other imitation effect as a control variable. When both imitation effects are tested 
together, the Expertise-Based imitation effect loses significance, but it maintains with a P-
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value < 0.1 in the same way when they were tested independently. In the same vein, the 
influence of the intensity of competition on imitation keeps the same significance (P-value 
< 0.001), supporting H3 and H4. Hence, the evidence provided by the set of models in 
Table 4 suggests that National newspapers imitate each other mainly for rivalry reasons 
and, in less measure, by uncertainty reasons. 
Finally, regarding the control variables, the probability of disclosure is positively and 
significantly related with the firm’s disclosure behavior (Inertia) in the immediate previous 
period. In other words, there is evidence of some disclosure inertia in the setting. On the 
other hand, the variable Uncertainty turned out to be significant. This indicates that as the 
firms are more familiar with disclosing information, they have a lower propensity to 
disclose. Regarding the performance measure (Performance), it has a negative and 
significant effect on disclosure, indicating that as the firms’ performance gets worst, the 
less the good news to be revealed and hence, the less incentives they have to disclose. In 
the same vein, the variable Market Concentration is significant and positive, indicating that 
as the competition is lower, firms’ propensity to disclose tends to rise. The variables Age, 
Dictatorship and Subsidy does not seem to have a significant effect on firm’s probability of 
disclosure.  
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Table 5 shows a set of models analyzing the Expertise-Based imitation effect among Local 
newspapers. Like in the previous database, there is no positive direct effect of the number 
of National newspapers (LExpertiseSize) releasing information in the previous period over 
the Local newspapers’ probability of disclosing information. Hence, we did not find a 
direct support for H1. Nevertheless, the interaction of LExpertiseSize with the specific 
Control H1 H2 H2 H1-H2 H3 H4 H1-H4
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
National Expertise Age -0.1253 0.5135 -0.8278+ -0.2314 0.3491
(-0.3824) (1.0547) (-1.6788) (-0.3934) (0.4544)
National Expertise Age x Uncertainty 0.0198+ 0.0228* 0.0239+
(1.8564) (2.1387) (1.7163)
National Expertise Age x Age 0.0160+ 0.0193* 0.0174+
(1.7763) (1.9988) (1.7799)
National Rivalry -0.2536 10.9724**** 9.5875***
(-1.6179) (3.8785) (3.1653)
National Rivalry x Market Concentration -9.9595**** -9.0060****
(-3.9194) (-3.3000)
Uncertainty 0.3544*** 0.3578*** 0.3312*** 0.3727**** 0.3513*** 0.3732*** 0.4391*** 0.4550***
(3.2466) (3.2491) (3.0785) (3.3342) (3.2317) (3.1520) (2.9249) (2.8083)
Age 0.3518 0.3372 0.6056 0.2763 0.5800 0.2754 1.0423+ 1.2742+
(0.8400) (0.8001) (1.3533) (0.6418) (1.2706) (0.6107) (1.8029) (1.9088)
Market Concentration 6.2710** 6.7988* 6.6356* 7.3099* 7.5573* 6.8306** 69.6054**** 64.0583****
(2.6013) (2.4269) (2.3487) (2.5683) (2.5727) (2.6418) (4.1776) (3.5508)
Inertia 4.0000**** 3.9992**** 3.7788**** 3.9993**** 3.7225**** 4.4389**** 4.3349**** 4.4971****
(8.4292) (8.4211) (7.8436) (8.2739) (7.5431) (7.6388) (6.2707) (5.8455)
LogGNP 26.0742**** 27.2205**** 20.5854* 28.2904**** 21.0157** 31.4124**** 17.3058+ 14.4318
(3.8140) (3.6305) (2.5668) (3.7558) (2.6193) (4.0386) (1.9437) (1.5850)
Performance -7.2262*** -7.1911*** -8.3171*** -8.1333*** -9.6591**** -6.8840*** -8.6572*** -10.1105***
(-3.0321) (-3.0257) (-3.1585) (-3.2680) (-3.4633) (-2.8655) (-2.8319) (-3.0163)
Subsidy 0.0159 -0.1192 0.3323 -0.1126 0.4585 -0.3120 -2.1921 -1.5246
(0.0151) (-0.1080) (0.2835) (-0.1001) (0.3778) (-0.2911) (-1.5865) (-0.9544)
Dictatorship -0.1444 -0.1386 -0.2843 -0.3854 -0.6400 -0.3147 1.7805 0.7689
(-0.1006) (-0.0966) (-0.2082) (-0.2666) (-0.4737) (-0.2143) (1.0059) (0.4374)
Observations 851 851 851 851 851 851 851 851
Number of firms 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
Pseudo R2 0.6360 0.6360 0.6450 0.6450 0.6560 0.6430 0.7000 0.7120
P-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
269.3 269.5 273.1 273 277.9 272.1 296.3 301.3
Degrees of freddom 8 9 10 10 11 9 10 13
Log-Likelihood -77.01 -76.94 -75.1 -75.18 -72.74 -75.63 -63.54 -60.99
TABLE 4
National Newspapers: Fixed Effects Logit Model testing  Expertise-based and Rivalry-based imitation effects
This table shows the results of a fixed-effect logit model. Estimators of each variable are reported on the top row and χ2 test values appear in brackets below
each coefficient. +,*,**,***,**** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% , .5% and .1% levels correspondingly. Estimated models have the expression
p(Xit)=P(yit=1|Xit)=exp[Xit'β]/( 1+exp[Xit'β]), where p(Xit) is the probability of voluntary disclosure for firm i at time t, β is the vector of estimated coefficients
and X is the vector of exogenous variables included in the model. National Rivalry for any national firm i is the number of rival national newspapers (different
from i ) disclosing information in the period t-1. National Expertise Age for any national firm i is the number of national firms older than 50 years (different
from i ) disclosing information a time t-1. Uncertainty is the negative of the accummulated number of disclosing periods of firm i from time t=0 to to time t-1.
Age is the number of years that firms have been in the market. Market Concentration is the logarithm of the number of potential readers in Spain at time t
divided by the number of national firms in the market at time t. DisInertia is a dummy varible with a value of 1 if firm i disclosed at time t-1 and 0 otherwise.
LogGNP is the logarithm of the gross national product in Spain at time t. Performance is the yearly average hazard rate (i.e. prob. of bankruptcy) measure for
firm t. Subsidy is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if time t occurs after 1984 and 0 otherwise. Dictatorship is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if time t
occurs after the dictatorship period in Spain and 0 otherwise.
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uncertainty about the consequences of disclosing information (Uncer) is significant and 
positive in all models (P-value < 0.005), indicating that as the Local newspapers experience 
in disclosing information is lower, they are more likely to copy large firms, in this case, 
National newspapers. This finding provides strong support for H2 and indirect support for 
H1. In relation to the effects of the variable LExpertiseAge as well as its interactions with 
the uncertainty variables (Uncertainty and Age) we cannot find any significant degree. 
Regarding the control variables, Uncertainty and Inertia are significant, as in the case of 
National newspapers. However, different from the National firm’s case, the variable 
Performance is non-significant indicating that the performance does not seem to play an 
important role as driver of disclosure. This might be because these firms do not face real 
competition, and hence, they have a kind of “captive markets” in which they are not 
penalized for revealing bad news (e.g. a low figure of sold items). Another difference in 
relation with the National newspapers is that older Local firms, as measured by the variable 
Age, tend to disclose more information, perhaps because they are more familiar with the 
characteristics of the market. This influence does not exist for National newspapers 
probably because they have other resources to get information about the market and hence, 
the age of the firms is not a significant driver of disclosure.  
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H1 H2 H2 H1-H2 H1 H2 H2 H1-H2 H1 H2 H2 H1-H2
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
National Expertise Size -0.1303* -0.0655 -0.0795 -0.0265 -0.1004 -0.0318 -0.0021 0.0445
(-2.2645) (-1.0392) (-0.9271) (-0.2965) (-1.4864) (-0.3393) (-0.0272) (0.4478)
National Expertise Size x Uncertainty 0.0082*** 0.0081*** 0.0094*** 0.0091***
(2.9254) (2.8790) (3.2462) (3.1210)
National Expertise Size x Age -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0013 -0.0010
(-0.8190) (-0.6290) (-1.1060) (-0.8556)
Local Expertise Age -0.0591+ -0.0591+ -0.0692* -0.0688+ -0.0311 -0.0481 -0.0574 -0.0669
(-1.9220) (-1.8457) (-2.0011) (-1.9428) (-0.8610) (-1.2133) (-1.4239) (-1.5782)
Local Expertise Age x Uncertainty 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0003
(0.0034) (0.0573) (0.4105) (0.5530)
Local Expertise Age x Age 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002
(0.6165) (0.6197) (0.9631) (0.7496)
Uncertainty 0.1081**** 0.1052**** 0.0554** 0.1046**** 0.0554** 0.1050**** 0.1050**** 0.1046**** 0.1035**** 0.1043**** 0.1030**** 0.0379 0.0354
(9.0438) (8.8101) (2.6567) (8.7300) (2.6508) (8.7773) (4.6373) (8.7105) (4.5449) (8.7241) (8.5322) (1.2934) (1.2005)
Age 0.4163**** 0.3416**** 0.3692**** 0.3476**** 0.3733**** 0.5102**** 0.5103**** 0.5071**** 0.5083**** 0.4081*** 0.4117**** 0.5078**** 0.5048****
(4.5736) (3.5251) (3.7985) (3.5735) (3.8299) (4.9314) (4.8357) (4.8973) (4.8103) (3.2873) (3.2970) (3.9783) (3.9393)
Inertia 6.4893**** 6.5246**** 6.6841**** 6.5218**** 6.6768**** 6.4368**** 6.4366**** 6.4303**** 6.4263**** 6.4867**** 6.4779**** 6.6020**** 6.5819****
(28.5657) (28.7924) (27.5232) (28.8051) (27.5400) (28.5096) (27.2948) (28.4389) (27.2033) (28.2927) (28.2630) (26.2968) (26.2548)
LogGNP -1.7137 0.7878 0.0586 0.7858 0.0687 -2.0013 -2.0040 -2.0531 -2.0977 0.0809 0.0109 -1.6655 -1.6763
(-0.9055) (0.3576) (0.0264) (0.3567) (0.0310) (-1.0582) (-0.9821) (-1.0857) (-1.0255) (0.0343) (0.0046) (-0.6768) (-0.6822)
Performance -1.8338 -1.5084 -1.7956 -1.5033 -1.8021 -2.0934 -2.0944 -2.2269 -2.2433 -1.7179 -1.9145 -2.3566 -2.5158
(-0.9759) (-0.8124) (-0.9601) (-0.8106) (-0.9649) (-1.1210) (-1.1098) (-1.1879) (-1.1828) (-0.9172) (-1.0213) (-1.2424) (-1.3353)
Subsidy -0.0590 -0.3574 -0.5716 -0.3648 -0.5767 -0.1550 -0.1547 -0.1704 -0.1665 -0.3455 -0.3830 -0.5479 -0.5689
(-0.1405) (-0.8115) (-1.2784) (-0.8279) (-1.2895) (-0.3639) (-0.3587) (-0.3991) (-0.3849) (-0.7791) (-0.8595) (-1.2046) (-1.2464)
Dictatorship -0.0538 -0.2433 -0.3913 -0.2345 -0.3835 0.3718 0.3723 0.3938 0.4017 0.0261 0.0773 0.1508 0.1844
(-0.1196) (-0.5318) (-0.8739) (-0.5127) (-0.8565) (0.7418) (0.7173) (0.7851) (0.7717) (0.0472) (0.1397) (0.2750) (0.3364)
Observations 6,522 6,522 6,522 6,522 6,522 6,522 6,522 6,522 6,522 6,522 6,522 6,522 6,522
Number of firms 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82
Pseudo R2 0.822 0.823 0.825 0.823 0.825 0.823 0.823 0.823 0.823 0.823 0.824 0.825 0.825
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4389 4394 4403 4395 4403 4393 4393 4393 4393 4395 4397 4406 4407
Degrees of freddom 7 8 9 9 10 8 9 9 10 9 11 11 13
Log-Likelihood -474.7 -472.2 -467.9 -471.8 -467.7 -472.9 -472.9 -472.7 -472.7 -471.8 -471 -466.4 -465.9
TABLE 5
Local newspapers: Fixed Effects Logit Model testing Expertise-based imitation iffect
This table shows the results of a fixed-effect logit model. Estimators of each variable are reported on the top row and χ2 test values appear in brackets below each coefficient. +,*,**,***,**** indicate
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% , .5% and .1% levels correspondingly. Estimated models have the expression p(Xit)=P(yit=1|Xit)=exp[Xit'β]/( 1+exp[Xit'β]), where p(Xit) is the probability of voluntary
disclosure fo firm i at time t, β is the vector of estimated coefficients and X is the vector of exogenous variables included in the model. National Expertise Size for any local firm i is the number of
national firms older than 50 years disclosing information a time t-1. Local Expertise Age  for any local firm i  is the number of local firms older than 50 years (different from i ) disclosing information a time 
t-1. Uncertainty is the negative of the accummulated number of disclosing periods of firm i from time t=0 to to time t-1. Age is the number of years that firms have been in the market. Market
Concentration  is the logarithm of the number of potential readers in Spain at time t divided by the number of national firms in the market at time t. DisInertia is a dummy varible with a value of 1 if firm i 
disclosed at time t-1 and 0 otherwise. LogGNP is the logarithm of the gross national product in Spain at time t. Performance is the yearly average hazard rate (i.e. prob. of bankruptcy) measure for firm
t. Subsidy is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if time t occurs after 1984 and 0 otherwise. Dictatorship is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if time t occurs after the dictatorship period in Spain and
0 otherwise.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In this work we explore the imitation of disclosure practices of non-financial information in 
the Spanish Newspapers Industry from 1966 to 1993. Regardless of the content of the 
information disclosed (good news or bad news), we tested two possible motivations for this 
imitative behavior: uncertainty and competition. We hypothesized that if imitation is driven 
by the uncertainty about the consequences of disclosure, firms will imitate the disclosure 
actions of what they believe are more experienced firms and this imitation would increase 
with the degree of uncertainty faced by firms. On the other hand, if imitation is motivated 
by competition, we expected to see that firms imitate the disclosure behavior of what they 
consider as direct rivals and the strength of the imitation would increase with the number of 
rivals disclosing information and the market concentration.  
Our results provide interesting insights about the imitation of disclosure patterns in our 
setting. Firstly, whenever firms face uncertainty, they tend to copy what they see as more 
“informed” organizations. In this regard, National organizations tend to imitate older firms 
and Local firms, imitate mostly what they perceive as large organizations. Moreover, the 
existence of this effect depends on the disclosure experience of firms. Firms that are 
unfamiliar with disclosing information are more likely to follow the actions of larger firms. 
In contrast, firms with more disclosing experience tend to be more autonomous when 
deciding whether disclosing or not. This result indicates that the imitation, in this case, is 
driven by informative reasons. Secondly, when firms face direct competition, the two 
effects exist simultaneously, although, in our setting, the Experience-based imitation 
became less representative and the Rivalry-Based imitation effect tended to be dominant. 
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This result is reasonable since more resourceful firms (such as National Newspapers) may 
have more resources to get information and scan the environment and hence, they are 
unlikely to imitate similar firms for information reasons (Gimeno et al. 2005). This result 
suggests that disclosing information is seen by firms as a potential element of competitive 
advantage. On the other hand, our findings indicate that this Rivalry-based effect depends 
on the degree of competition in the market. In other words, newspapers facing more 
competition are more likely to imitate their rivals to maintain their competitive position in 
the market. Thirdly, regarding the Expertise-based imitation effect, our results show that 
the accumulated disclosure experience seems to be a more robust measure of firm’s 
uncertainty about the consequences of disclosure. Based on these conclusions, we believe 
that at least in some extend, we contributed to previous accounting literature by providing 
an analysis that studies simultaneously and disentangles two motivations to imitate. 
Finally, we would like to remark that we only considered two types of isomorphism, one 
derived from the lack of certainty which have been addressed similarly by different fields 
(institutional isomorphism, information cascades, herding, etc.) and one derived from 
competitive forces. However, institutional literature recognizes the existence of another two 
imitation types that have no relation with uncertainty but are motivated by other forces: 
normative and coercive (DiMagio and Powell 1986)9. Since we didn’t integrate these 
imitation drivers directly in our empirical model, we cannot rule out the possibility that our 
                                                          
9
 Normative isomorphism comes from the collective definition of the conditions and methods of the work 
delimited by the members of an occupation. This type of isomorphism is the one that can be attached for 
instance, to the professional mobility of executives among organizations, the common academic background 
of managers or the interaction of organizations through associations and commerce chambers. The second 
type, coercive isomorphism, refers to the case when firms imitate due to formal and informal pressures 
coming from the organizations they depend on or by cultural expectations of the society where the 
organizations operate (DiMagio and Powell 1986). 
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empirical findings are influenced by these factors (Mizruchi and Fein 1999). Nevertheless, 
we indirectly addressed some potential issues related with coercive forces. First, disclosure 
was not mandatory for organizations in any way during the analyzed period of time. 
Second, our inter-temporal approach together with the inclusion of the variable 
Dictatorship allow us to control for the informal pressure to increase transparency in 
markets demanded by democratic societies over time that potentially might force firms to 
disclose. Third, our results are naturally isolated from some coercive forces coming for 
stakeholders in capital markets (Aerts et al. 2005) since during the period analyzed all 
organizations were privately owned. Even though this controls, we cannot totally discard 
that the imitation observed might result from similarities in the ethical values or the 
academic background of managers of the firms, which could be considered as normative 
isomorphism. This flaw, however, is common in the empirical work since controlling for 
all the different types of isomorphism is quite a difficult task (Lieberman and Asaba 2006).  
Regarding future research windows, we did not make any statement regarding the 
profitability of imitation. This is, how profitable is for firms to imitate industry leaders or 
competitors regarding disclosure behavior? Are there significant differences in profitability 
from imitating one or another?  We consider this issue as an interesting and challenging 
field for future research.  
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CHAPTER II 
IMPATIENCE IS THE POWER’S FEEBLENESS: INFORMATION 
SHARING AND DELAY COSTS10 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this work, we specifically explore how penalties for delay influence the usually found 
negative relation between traders’ bargaining power and their willingness to share 
accounting information. We propose that the interaction between bargaining power and 
delay cost is likely to rise up most powerful firms’ impatience to close negotiations. Under 
these circumstances, this type of firms might want to share accounting information to reach 
early agreements. To test this argument, we conduct an experiment with 670 under-
graduate students using a sequential bargaining setting with incomplete information. Our 
results support our main thesis, and we conclude that penalties for delay are able, at least to 
some extent, to diminish the negative effects of bargaining power over information sharing. 
 
Keywords: Sharing information, experiment, delay cost, bargaining power 
 
 
                                                          
10
 We thank participants and referees of the 2013 Raymond Konopka Annual Workshop in Management 
Accounting and Accounting History, Internal Seminar Series of Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, the 2013 
European Accounting Association Annual Conference and the 2013 American Accounting Association 
Annual Conference for their helpful comments. This study has been funded by research projects ECO2010-
22105-C03-03 of the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The sharing of information between supply chain members generates improvements in 
coordination that enhance the overall efficiency of the supply chain11 (e.g. Kulp, Lee and 
Ofek 2004). However, the existence of bargaining power asymmetries may impede this 
efficiency gains since most powerful supply chain members tend to withhold information 
(e.g. Van den Abbeele, Roodhooft and Warlop 2009). Taking the buyer’s side, we use an 
economic experiment based on the theoretical notions of non-cooperative bargaining theory 
to study how the economic incentives (in the way of delay costs) of this framework 
influence the bargaining power-information sharing relation. We propose that when 
penalties for delay are considered, more powerful buyers will be more eager to close 
negotiations and this impatience will result in a higher willingness to share information.  
Buyer’s impatience (for reaching agreements) arises due to the jointed action of bargaining 
power and delay costs. When considered separately, both factors may be associated with a 
lower buyer’s willingness to share information. As shown by previous work, more 
powerful buyers will tend to share less information due to sociological reasons (Van den 
Abbeele et al. 2009). On the other hand, delay costs may provide buyers (e.g. when they get 
to make an offer) with a bargaining advantage that might substitute the sharing of 
information as a coordination mechanism. Hence, as the delay costs are higher, buyers are 
less likely to share information. However, when these two previous factors interact, we 
claim that the jointed effect is likely to motivate information sharing. More powerful buyers 
expect higher profits from negotiations and hence, they also incur in higher loses as 
                                                          
11
 The gains of improving coordination among supply chain members may represent a reduction in costs 
and/or an increase in the supply chain value-added by up to 25% (Crook and Combs 2007). 
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negotiations get longer and penalties for delay increase. This type of buyers will be more 
interested in finishing negotiations as early as possible. In this regard, theoretical and 
experimental research indicates that the disclosure of information might enhance 
coordination and decrease the length of negotiations (Black and Bulkley 1988; Valley 
Gibbons and Bazerman 2002). Thus, given the urgency of more powerful buyers to reach 
agreements and the role of information sharing as an agreement facilitator, we propose that 
more powerful buyers would be prone to share accounting information in order to shorten 
negotiations. 
Despite non-cooperative sequential bargaining settings began in the 80’s (e.g. Rubinstein 
1985; Grossman and Perry 1986; Cramton 1984)12, the evaluation of strategic theories of 
bargaining with private information using experiments is a relatively recent line of research 
(Ausubel, Cramton and Deneckere 2002). In this regard, previous experimental accounting 
literature studying the factors driving the use of accounting information in negotiations 
between buyers and sellers is scarce. To our knowledge, only one previous piece of work 
deals with this topic by analyzing the moderating effect of bargaining power on the 
voluntary sharing of information, taking mainly a buyer’s perspective (Van den Abbeele et 
al. 2009). This paper explores the sociological notion that powerful buyers rely on 
                                                          
12
 Game theorists have modeled this type of bargaining situations under different assumptions, for example, 
considering complete information (Rubisntein 1982), one-sided incomplete information alternating offers 
(Grossman and Perry 1986, Rubinstein 1985) and two-sided incomplete information alternating offers 
(Chatterjee and Samuelson 1987; Cramton 1992) or with single side offers (Cramton 1984). In the same vein, 
some previous research has developed models where bargainers may have outside options. For example, 
Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole (1987) developed a one-sided incomplete information model (seller’s valuation 
is common knowledge) where only the seller was allowed to make offers. In this model, only the seller (not 
the buyer) was allowed to look for outside options or consume the good himself. In the same vein, Chatterjee 
and Lee (1998) provided a model with complete information (both parties valuation was known), with only 
the seller making offers but allowing the buyer to search for outside opportunities. Chikte and Deshmukh 
(1987) modeled a game where both parties can perform outside searching considering that their searching 
abilities are common knowledge.   
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enforcing mechanisms to negotiate and provides experimental evidence supporting a 
negative relation between buyers’ bargaining power and the sharing of accounting 
information and leaves an opened door for further accounting research on incentive systems 
that stimulate a higher flow of information among supply chain members (Van Abbeele et 
al. 2009, 262). We take a step on that direction by analyzing how the consideration of delay 
costs modifies the already known negative relation between bargaining power and delay 
costs. 
In order to test this idea, we conducted an experiment with 670 under-graduate (students) 
volunteers simulating a price negotiation among independent supply chain members 
following the main features of a sequential bargaining situation with one-sided asymmetric 
information and alternating offers (Grossman and Perry 1986; Srivastava 2001). We choose 
this specific bargaining setting to develop our work since on one hand, previous research 
(theoretical and experimental) provides intuition about the general behavior of negotiators 
in this bargaining context, and on the other, the potential effect of the economic incentives 
of this setting over the traders’ willingness to share accounting information has not been 
addressed in the past. For testing our arguments, we manipulated the bargaining power 
asymmetries (by the introduction of outside options to the buyer) and the level of the delay 
cots (high and low). Our results confirm that the economic incentives created by delay costs 
are able, at least in some extent, to motivate powerful partners to share information, 
mitigating the natural propensity of powerful partners to withhold their private accounting 
information.  
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Our main contribution is identifying and testing a factor (delay costs) that interacts with 
bargaining power to create effective incentives (impatience) to motivate the sharing of 
information among supply chain members (reducing the inefficient behavior of most 
powerful parties). A secondary contribution of this paper is to complement previous 
accounting work relating bargaining power and information sharing by linking this research 
line with the empirical and theoretical work developed by the economics field. Finally, we 
contribute to engross the currently body of experimental research using dynamic bargaining 
models with incomplete information, both in the fields of economics and accounting 
(Ausubel et al. 2002).  
The rest of the paper has five sections. First, we provide our theoretical development of our 
set of hypotheses relating bargaining power, delay costs and impatience with information 
sharing. The third section describes the experimental procedure. The fourth section 
provides experimental results supporting the validity of our hypotheses. Finally, in section 
five we discuss our results, make conclusions and address some options for future research. 
 
 
II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Figure 1 provides a comprehensive summary of our set o hypotheses. 
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using this same notion of power allow us to better compare our results with previous work 
inside Accounting.  According to Social Exchange Theory, the bargaining power of a buyer 
over a seller is given by the buyer’s capacity to influence the seller’s actions13 (Emerson 
1976). This capacity to influence on the counterparty’s actions (i.e. bargaining power) is a 
function of the relative dependency among parties, which is likely to increase (decrease) as 
the buyer’s valuation of the resources provided by the seller increases (decreases) (Emerson 
1962).  Given this dependency-based view of power, those buyers possessing more 
valuable alternatives than their trading partners would have a lower valuation of the 
resources provided by their counterparties and hence they will be less dependent and as a 
consequence, more powerful (Wolfe and Mcginn 2005).  
In bargaining situations, sharing private information is likely to enhance the coordination 
among partners, leading to potential better agreements (Cramton 1984). However, this 
positive effect is not costless since sharing information might deteriorate the bargaining 
position of negotiators (e.g. Black and Bulkley 1988) 14. As a consequence, a profit-
maximizing buyer capable of inducing coordination by any other mechanisms will tend to 
share less information, since in this way she might minimize the costs of disclosure without 
compromising their negotiation goals. In this regard, more powerful buyers (buyers having 
better outside options) tend to use other mechanisms (e.g. more distributive bargaining 
strategies, stick to a position, etc.) instead of sharing information with their counterparties. 
This notion suggests that as the bargaining power of negotiators increases, their willingness 
                                                          
13
 As we mentioned before, we conduct the analysis from the buyer’s perspective and hence, we do not 
formulate any hypothesis regarding the seller’s initial beliefs or initial offer in the negotiation. 
14
 Different from the proprietary costs mentioned by the disclosure literature (e.g. Verrecchia 1983), in 
bargaining situation, costs are not associated to the risk of replication or the impossibility of controlling the 
potential receivers of the information, but with the deterioration of the bargaining position. 
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to share information tends to be lower. Even when this idea has been tested already in 
previous accounting and sociological experimental work in settings where delay costs are 
not considered (Van den Abbeele et al. 2009; De Dreu and Van Kleef 2004), we formulate 
the following hypothesis in order to verify if this negative relation also holds in a 
bargaining setting where penalizations for delay are taken into account:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The probability that a buyer shares information decreases as its 
bargaining power increases. 
 
Delay costs and information sharing 
The term “delay costs” refers to the profit losses resulting from delaying agreements. These 
costs vary according with the time-sensitiveness of the profits related to negotiations. This 
is, if the profits associated with negotiations are expected to decrease slowly (fast) as the 
time goes by (i.e. as negotiations are longer), then the delay costs faced by bargainers will 
be lower (higher). In this sense, factors such as the speed at which the consumer’s interest 
in the negotiated product is eroded, the existence of contractual penalizations (e.g. due to 
late delivery) or market’s contestability (e.g. threat potential competitive entry) may 
generate higher business’ time-sensitiveness and hence, higher delay costs (Srivastava, 
Chakravarti and Rapoport 2000).   
In negotiation settings where the penalization for delay is identical for buyers and sellers, 
the trader making an offer has a negotiating advantage that increases with the level of delay 
costs (Rubinstein 1982). Based on this notion, we suggest that as the delay costs increase, 
buyers making offers will enjoy a more favorable bargaining position and hence, they will 
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avoid potential costs of sharing information by relying more on the use of this mover’s 
advantage (i.e. submitting lower counterproposals) than in sharing information. In other 
words, when buyers get to make an offer, the existence of delay costs provides them an 
additional bargaining plus that acts in parallel with the effect explained H1, and generates a 
decrease in the buyer’s willingness to share information. This notion motivates the 
following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The probability that a buyer shares information decreases as 
the delay costs attached to the negotiation increase. 
 
Information sharing and impatience 
We mentioned that, regardless of the buyer’s bargaining power, the presence of higher 
delay costs exerts a direct negative effect on the buyer’s decision of sharing information 
(H2). However, we claim that the global effect of delay costs on information sharing 
includes another effect that depends on the buyer’s bargaining power. We refer to this 
effect as “impatience”.  
More powerful buyers are likely to obtain larger shares of negotiation profits (e.g. Pinkley, 
Neale and Bennet 1994; De Dreu and Van Kleef 2004, Van den Abbeele et al. 2009)15. As a 
result, these buyers (i.e. more powerful) face larger potential losses as the total penalization 
for delay increases. Consequently, this kind of buyers will be more impatient to reach 
agreements in order to minimize global profit losses (Grossman and Perry 1986).  
                                                          
15
 If the size of the cake is not time-sensitive (i.e. there are no costs for prolonging negotiations), an 
immediate result it that the profits in absolute value earned by more powerful traders are also larger than 
those obtained by less powerful ones (e.g. Van den Abbeele et al. 2009). 
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The voluntary sharing of information may be an effective mechanism to reduce the 
uncertainty generated by information asymmetries, speed up coordination (e.g. Rubinstein 
1982; Cramton 1984; Crawford 1990) and reaching earlier agreements (e.g. Crawford and 
Sobel 1982; Crawford 1990; Valley et al. 2002)16. Given this role of information as 
coordination enhancer, one would expect that more impatient buyers (i.e. powerful with 
higher delay costs) would show a higher willingness to disclose information (in order to 
reduce the length of negotiations and avoid further profit losses due to delay costs). Hence, 
even when the willingness to share less information is expected to decrease with the 
buyer’s bargaining power (H1), we propose that this negative relation is likely to be smaller 
as buyers face higher delay costs. This reasoning motivates the following hypothesis:     
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The probability of sharing information of more powerful buyers 
increases with the level of delay costs.  
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
 
Design of the Experiment 
In order to test our Hypotheses, we conducted a 2 x 2 experiment design. We use this 
experimental approach in accordance with prior accounting and economics sources (Van 
                                                          
16 Due to the existence of delay costs, the notion of efficiency in our bargaining contexts is negatively related 
with the length of negotiations. In other words, earlier agreements minimize global penalizations for delay 
and hence, shorter negotiations are considered more efficient.   For a detailed review of the efficiency in 
bargaining situations see Camerer and Loewenstain (1993). 
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den Abbeele et al. 2009; Srivastava et al. 2000; Srivastava 2001). In our experimental 
design, we monitor the relative power (high or equal) as well as the cost of delaying the 
negotiation (high or low) of the participants, in order to see how these factors influence the 
parties’ willingness to voluntary disclose information.  
The participants negotiated in dyads composed by one seller and one buyer. Power was 
manipulated by informing the participants about the availability of outside options for 
themselves (e.g. Giebels, De Dreu and Van de Vliert 2000, Pinkley et al. 1994), as well as a 
notion of their counterparties’ (Wolfe and Mcginn 2005). In the higher power buyer dyad, 
the buyer was told that he had other options in the market while his counterpart considered 
him as his top choice. In this case, the buyers were informed that the value of their 
alternative was 5 euros17. On the other hand, the supplier was told that he did not have any 
other alternative to transact in the market, but the buyer considered him his favorite option. 
In the equal power group, buyers and sellers were told that they did not have any other 
alternative to transact in the market, but that they were the favorite option for their partners. 
In this case, the value of the outside options was fixed at zero. The value of the external 
choices was treated as private information for each partner in order to achieve ecological 
validity (Wolfe and Mcginn 2005).  
Regarding the delay costs, we manipulated this concept by informing the participants that 
their benefits would be discounted by a factor equal to dt-1. Where t accounts for the current 
round of the negotiation and d is a parameter measuring the time sensitiveness of the 
business opportunity linked to the negotiation. The value of the parameter d was fixed at 
                                                          
17 This value was fixed at a level in which the buyer is in a more favorable position for negotiating but it is 
relatively unattractive compared with the potential gains from trading (Van den Abbeele et al. 2009).  
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0.90 for the low delay cost group and at 0.60 for the high delay cost group (Srivastava, 
2001). In order to facilitate the participant’s calculations, we provided them with a figure 
indicating the value of the discount factor at every negotiation round. Finally, the directions 
of the experiment indicated to both negotiators that “their counterparty has a good 
reputation on the market and that you two completed successful transactions in the past”. 
This statement was introduced in order to create a sense of trust within the dyads. We did 
not manipulate this concept in the experiment.  
 
Negotiation task 
The negotiation task of the experiment follows the basic structure of a non-cooperative 
bargaining process with alternating offers and one-sided incomplete information developed 
analytically by Grossman and Perry (1986) and tested experimentally by Srivastava (2001), 
incorporating two main changes: a) differences in bargaining power among traders given by 
outside options and b) the possibility for the buyers to share their private information 
explicitly while submitting offers during bargaining.  
Our experimental setting simulates a negotiation between a seller and a buyer.  The seller is 
a producer of a good with a unitary production cost,        euros. The buyer, on the 
other hand, is a middle man buying 1 unit of the good from the producer at a price     and 
reselling it to an end consumer at a fixed price,     =150 euros. Both    and     are 
common knowledge to traders. The buyer, however, has a distribution cost (  ) of 10 euro 
per unit that is only known by her. The asymmetry in information is common knowledge 
for both individuals. The bargaining proceeds sequentially during a series of infinite 
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discrete periods of time. In the first period the seller makes a price offer,   , and the buyer 
either accepts or rejects. If the buyer accepts, the negotiation ends in the first period. 
However, if the buyer rejects, she makes a counteroffer   , at period two. When making a 
counteroffer, the buyer is allowed to share his private information with the seller. Offers 
and counteroffers continue until an agreement is reached or any of the parties ends the 
negotiation without reaching any agreement. In this setting, the bargainer’s gains diminish 
according to a commonly known discount rate equal to      as the periods needed to reach 
an agreement are more than one. Considering this features, the benefits for each partner at 
any period t of the negotiation are          (     )  
    and         (       
  ) 
   18. If the process ends without an agreement, the parties’ payoffs are equal to a 
certain value defined by their outside options.  
An important theoretical intuition of the used bargaining task is that buyer’s actions are 
driven by the interaction between their expected profits and the costs of delay. These two 
factors together model the buyer’s preferences about the length of negotiations, or in other 
words, the buyer’s impatience for reaching agreements. Depending on the level of this 
impatience, negotiations could take one of three different paths: a) buyers accepting the 
initial offer; b) buyers rejecting the initial offer and making an acceptable counterproposal; 
c) buyers rejecting the initial offer and making an unacceptable counterproposal (Grossman 
and Perry, 1983).  Given that this work analyzes the buyers’ willingness to share 
information in a negotiation context in which information cannot be share unless the 
                                                          
18
 In this context, the seller’s strategy would be to offer a price that maximizes her expected payoff based on 
the discount factor and her belief about the buyer’s valuation. On the contrary, the buyer’s strategy would 
consist in using the seller’s offer to compare the payoff in the current period to the discounted payoff in future 
periods and decide whether accepting it or making a counter proposal revealing or not information to the 
seller (Srivastava 2001). 
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seller’s initial offer is rejected, we do not make any hypothesis regarding the information 
sharing behavior of the group of buyers accepting the initial offer. In other words, we do 
not explore how the existence of private information influences the buyer’s decision of 
accepting the seller’s first offer or not19. Instead, we concentrate our analysis in the buyers 
who have decided to negotiate and need to make the decision of whether sharing 
information or not with their counterproposals.  
 
Participants and procedure 
Participants were recruited from the management accounting undergraduate courses at a 
large university in Spain during the first term of the academic year 2011-2012. Students 
were told that their participation in the experiment was voluntary. They also were notified 
about the room, time and date of the experimental sessions, as well as the potential rewards 
the may obtain in case of attending the experiment. At the end of the day, the experiment 
was conducted with 670 participants during eight experimental one-hour sessions. 
According to this recruitment procedure, we consider our participants as volunteers (Eckel 
and Grossman 2000).  
On the other hand, we consider that undergraduate students were appropriate for our 
experimental testing since economic theories are likely to be applied in general, not only to 
older or graduated individuals (Croson 2005). In the same manner, even when the 
participants’ behavior in the laboratory may differ from that of a CEO (e.g. Levitt and List 
2007), the use of undergraduate students is a common practice in experiments testing 
                                                          
19
 A possible consequence of this approach is that our sample has some selection bias. However, working with 
this subsample allows a more direct interpretation of the factors driving the trader’s decision of sharing 
information. 
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economic theories (e.g. Binmore, Morgan, Shaked and Sutton 1991; Fisher, Frederickson 
and Sean 2000; Valley et al. 2002; Solnick 2007).  
Regarding the rewards, the payment was consistent with the theory to be tested (e.g. Croson 
2005). The rewards involved a fixed payment of 0.25 points over the participant’s final 
grade of their management accounting class (this fixed payment was given to all 
participants), plus a variable payment up to an additional 1.25 points (e.g. James and Cohen 
2004) depending on the participant’s performance during the negotiation. The fixed payment 
allows us to offset the effects of randomization and to encourage the participation of more 
risk-adverse subjects (Heckman and Smith 1995; Harrison, Johnson, McInnes and 
Rutstr m 2005). The variable payment helps to encourage the involvement of participants 
in the bargaining task in the participants. The economic value of the fixed and variable 
rewards was 4.50 and 22.21 euro, respectively. This difference assures the involvement of 
the undergraduate students within the negotiation (Croson 2005). The fixed payment was 
given to the participants in a coupon at the end of the experiment while their variable 
reward was informed to them the day after the experiment. 
The participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions (high bargaining 
power-low delay cost, high bargaining power-high delay cost, low bargaining power-low 
delay cost  and low bargaining power-high delay cost) and to a role (buyer or seller). 
Buyers and suppliers sat in different rooms so negotiations were anonymous. As a first 
step, the participants received a brief explanation of the general purpose of the experiment, 
the possible payoffs, their information endowments and their set of available actions. Then, 
they were given 15 minutes to read the written directions and ask questions about it. After 
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this (but before starting the negotiation), participants filled out an initial questionnaire in 
order to collect data regarding their perceptions of bargaining power, as well as other 
general characteristics such as trust perception, age, gender and professional experience. 
Once this previous stages were completed, the negotiation started. The negotiation 
consisted in a sequence of offers and counter-offers (started always by the seller) until a 
final agreement was reached, any of the parties left the negotiation or the time limit of the 
experiment was over. At any stage of the negotiation, participants were free to share any 
information with their counterparts in a written way. All offers, counter-offers and 
information shared during the trading were written on a negotiation sheet that was visible 
for both partners during all the experiment. Finally, after negotiations were closed, 
participants filled out a brief final questionnaire in order to check if their perceptions of 
power and trust suffered any change during the negotiation process.  
Since the experiment was conducted with 670 participants (335 dyads), our database 
captures the characteristics of 335 buyers. The data of 33 buyers was not considered for the 
empirical testing due to missing values and hence, our database was composed by 302 
buyer-observations. Table 1 shows the distribution of participants by accounting course and 
undergraduate program. As previously mentioned, in this work we focus on the buyers 
rejecting the seller’s first offer and making a counterproposal.  From the 302 buyers in our 
database, 149 buyers (49%) accepted the first offer and hence, our sample for testing our 
set of hypotheses was composed by the remaining153 buyers.  
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Variables 
Endogenous Variables 
Buyer’s information sharing. This variable assigns a value of 1 if the buyer released its 
private cost information to the seller. 
Exogenous Variables 
Bargaining Power. This variable accounts for the condition assigned to participants in the 
experiment. It takes a value of 1 if the buyer belonged to the high power condition of the 
experiment and 0 otherwise.  
Delay Costs. This variable accounts for the condition assigned to participants in the 
experiment. It assigns the value of 1 to the buyers belonging to dyads in the high delay cost 
condition and 0 otherwise.  
Impatience. This variable accounts for the interaction between the variables Bargaining 
Power and Delay Costs.  
 
Cost Management 17% Accounting & Finance 17%
Cost Accounting 83% Business Administration 56%
Law & Business Administration 27%
Total 100% Total 100%
TABLE 1
Distribution of participants according with accounting courses and undergraduate program
Undergraduate ProgramAccounting courses
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Control Variables 
Buyer’s First Counterproposal. This measure controls for the buyer’s first counter 
proposal. The sharing of information may be conditioned by this factor since a very low 
offer is unlikely to be accompanied by information sharing because it might cause 
coordination problems due to fairness issues (Camerer and Loewenstain 1993; Bolton and 
Ockenfels 2000). On the other hand, this first counterproposal is the buyer’s way to use her 
“mover advantage” by submitting lower counterproposals. 
Rounds. This variable measures the number of rounds needed to reach an agreement. This 
is a variable typically used in theoretical and experimental bargaining literature (e.g. 
Grossman and Perry 1986; Srivastva 2001). We include this variable since the impatience 
for closing agreements increases as the negotiation reaches a higher round.  
Trust. This is a self-reported measure of the buyer’s trust in the supplier during the 
negotiation (from 1 to 100). Independently of the bargaining power or the delay costs, 
higher levels of trust may motivate buyers to release more information (e.g. Baiman and 
Rajan 2002).  
Distributive. This control takes the value of 1 if any distributive negotiation mechanisms 
(e.g. threats) where used by the buyers and 0 otherwise. Buyers using this type of 
mechanisms intuitively are expected to share less information, hence, we include this 
variable in order to control for this factor20.  
                                                          
20 We do not include controls for factors such as gender, academic background or professional experience 
since they turned out to be non-significant in all models. We consider these non-significant results as an 
indicator that all these effects were randomized away. Results are available from authors. 
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IV. RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENT 
 
Summary of statistics 
Table 2 displays a summary of statistics. As it can be seen, 44% of the buyers disclosed 
their cost information during the negotiation. On the other hand, in average, agreements 
were reached between two and three rounds (with a maximum of 8 and a minimum of 2). In 
the same vein, the average initial offer was approximately 118 euros (with a maximum of 
130 and a minimum of 101).  Regarding the variable Trust, the mean is observed at a value 
close to 55, which indicates that the average participant has a medium level of trust on her 
counterparty. In is interesting that the presence of distributive behavior was not common 
among the participants (around 6%) 
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Buyer's Information Sharing 153 0.44        0.50        0 1
Bargaining Power (High=1/0 otherwise) 153 0.51        0.50        0 1
Delay costs (High=1 / 0 otherwise) 153 0.39        0.49        0 1
Impatience ( Buyer's bargaining power x Delay costs) 153 0.21        0.41        0 1
Buyer's First Counterproposal 153 117.82     4.38        101 130
Rounds 153 2.61        1.13        2 8
Trust 153 54.87      18.80      10 100
Distributive 153 0.06        0.24        0 1
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents means, standard deviations, minimums and maximums. All variables have been previously defined.
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As an experimental check, we corroborated that buyers assigned to the higher bargaining 
power condition indeed considered themselves as more powerful (F(247,1)=24.95, 
p<.0000).  In the same vein, Table 3 shows the matrix of correlations among the variables. 
The correlations are in the expected direction and as we will show, none of them represent 
a potential estimation problem. The correlation between Bargaining Power, Delay Costs 
and Impatience was expected since the latter is calculated directly from the other two.  
 
Hypotheses Testing 
The results from a Levine’s test for the different groups of the variables Bargaining Power 
(P>F(1,151)=0.0062) and Delay Costs (P>F(1,151)=0.0108) revealed that the assumption 
of equality of variances is not meet, and hence, we do not present any pairwise mean 
comparison among groups based on an ANOVA/ANCOVA analysis21. Instead, in order to 
test or hypotheses, we use a logistic model. Table 4 shows the estimation of a logistic 
model (coefficients, odds ratio and marginal effects) calculated using Stata 12.  
                                                          
21
 When the equal variance assumption is not fulfilled, the results of the ANOVA/ANCOVA analysis may be 
incorrect or misleading. This problem is magnified when the sample sizes among groups are unequal, as it is 
in our case. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Buyer's Information Sharing -0.241 -0.115 -0.098 0.425 -0.227 0.008 -0.109 
2 Buyer´s bargaining Power (High=1/0 otherwise) -0.241 0.038 0.504 -0.185 0.004 -0.033 0.078
3 Delay costs (High=1 / 0 otherwise) -0.115 0.038 0.640 0.041 -0.090 -0.068 -0.030 
4 Impatience ( Buyer's bargaining power x Delay costs) -0.098 0.504 0.640 -0.055 -0.058 -0.041 0.076
5 Buyer’s First Counterproposal 0.334 -0.212 0.043 -0.090 -0.596 0.109 -0.068 
6 Rounds -0.172 -0.040 -0.029 -0.049 -0.483 -0.238 -0.008 
7 Trust 0.038 -0.040 -0.064 -0.028 0.115 -0.207 0.066
8 Distributive -0.109 0.078 -0.030 0.076 -0.085 -0.036 0.063
Table 3 presents the Pearson (Spearman) Correlations above (below) the diagonal of the matrix. (**) significant at 1%; (*) significant at 5% and (+)| significant
at 10%. Variables defined previously.
Pearson (Spearman) Correlations Below (Above) the Diagonal of the Matrix
TABLE 3
***
**
**
**
**
**
*
** **
**
**
**
**
**
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As we can see, the Buyer’s Bargaining Power has a negative and significant impact on the 
buyer’s willingness to share information.  
This result is aligned with previous empirical findings (Van den Abbeele et al. 2009) and 
provides evidence supporting H1. Likewise, the Delay Costs faced by the buyers have a 
significant and negative influence on her information sharing behavior. In other words, H2 
is also supported. On the other hand, as expected, the impatience effect turned out to be 
positive and significant, suggesting that, as expected, increases in the delay costs are 
capable of diminish the negative effect of bargaining power on information sharing.  This 
(1)
Control 
VARIABLES Variables
Buyer´s bargaining Power (High=1/0 otherwise) -1.426 *** 0.240      *** -0.332 ****
(-2.98) (-2.98) (-3.18)
Delay costs (High=1 / 0 otherwise) -1.430 * 0.239      * -0.323 *
(-2.41) (-2.41) (-2.69)
Impatience (Buyer's Bargaining Power x Delay Costs) 1.556 * 4.741      * 0.370 *
(2.02) (2.02) (2.26)
Buyer’s First Counterproposal 0.210 *** 0.195 ** 1.216      ** 0.047 **
(2.83) (2.76) (2.76) (2.79)
Rounds -0.028 -0.133 0.875      -0.032 
(-0.15) (-0.66) (-0.66) (-0.66)
Trust 0.000 -0.004 0.996      -0.001 
(-0.04) (-0.35) (-0.35) (-0.35)
Distributive -1.013 -1.241 0.289      -0.249 
(-1.24) (-1.36) (-1.36) (-1.82)
Constant -24.958 -21.821 0.000      
(-2.79) (-2.55) (-2.55)
Observations 153 153 153
Pseudo r2 0.146 0.172 0.172
χ 2 25.13 28.76 28.76
Degrees of freedom 4 7 7
TABLE 4
H1, H2, H3
Coefficients
(2)
This table shows the results of the LOGIT regression. The first column shows the estimated coefficients of the control variables. The second
column shows the estimated coefficients for the whole model. The fourth column displays the estimated odds ratio for the total model. The las
columns shows the marginal effects for each variable of the whole model. Estimated coeficients, odds ratios and marginal effects for each variable
are reported on the top row and χ2 -test values appear in brackets below each coefficient. +,*,**,***,**** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% ,
.5% and .1% levels correspondingly. 
Odds Ratio
Marginal effects
Pr (BIS)=.40736799
LOGIT model for the variable Buyer's Information Sharing (BIS)
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finding supports H3. Figure 2 shows the predicted probabilities corresponding to the four 
experimental conditions. The probability of disclosing information of those buyers in the 
high bargaining power-high delay costs group (0.33) is higher than the probability of those 
buyers assigned to the High bargaining power-Low delay costs condition (0.30).    
 
Regarding the control variables, the Buyer’s First Counterproposal was found highly 
significant, while the results indicate the factors such trust, distributive behavior or even the 
number of rounds negotiated did not exert an influence on the buyer’s willingness to share 
information. 
V.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we explore the notion that the combined action of delay costs and bargaining 
power is able to stimulate buyer’s impatience for reaching agreements and reduce the 
negative effect of bargaining power on information sharing. More specifically, we test this 
This figure shows the marginal probabilities calculated using the logistic regression model presented in table
4. all probabilities are significant at the 1% level. correspondingly. Calculations were made taking the
variables Rounds , Initial offer , Trust  and Distributive at mean values.
FIGURE 2
Predicted Probabilities
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idea in an experimental setting simulating a non-cooperative bargaining process between 
two supply chain members (i.e. an independent buyer and a seller) with alternating offers 
(started always by the seller) and one-sided incomplete information (buyer-side). We used a 
2x2 experimental design where we manipulated the relative power (high and equal) as well 
as the cost of delaying the agreements (high or low) of the participants.  
Our findings indicate that, despite the fact that separately, both the buyer’s bargaining 
power and the delay costs have a negative effect on buyer’s willingness to share 
information, the combined effect of them creates an incentive, that we refer to as 
impatience, leading buyer’s to share more information. Our rationale to explain this effect 
is based on the argument that as the costs of delay increase, firms expecting higher benefits 
from negotiations will be more impatient to reach agreements since their potential losses 
from delaying negotiations will also be larger. Given that bargaining power is positively 
linked to trading profits, we claim that most powerful bargainers will be more impatient 
and this impatience will be even higher as the delay costs rise up. On the other hand, since 
the disclosure of information might help partners to coordinate faster and shorten the length 
of negotiations, most impatient buyers may have an additional motivation to share 
information in order to speed up agreements. Based on our results, we conclude that the 
economic incentives created by potential penalizations for delay are able, at least at some 
extent, able to reduce the natural tendency of most powerful buyers to hide information.  
Even when we do not control for the individual’s natural fairness propensity, we believe 
that what might look as a fair behavior could be instead explained in terms of the strategic 
reality of the negotiation (Binmore et al. 1991). This is, keeping the individual’s propensity 
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to fairness constant, bargainers facing higher delay costs are motivated to offer fair deals in 
order to reduce the length of their negotiations. Anyhow, the low presence of distributive 
negotiation approaches (only around 3% of the buyers) seems to indicate that traders 
preferred the sharing of information over the use of coercive techniques as a mechanism to 
speed up agreements. Further experimental research may be needed in order to clarify this 
issue. In the same vein, previous theoretical and experimental results (Black and Bulkley 
1988; Valley et al. 2002) stating that the voluntary disclosure of information acts as a key 
shortening factor of the length of negotiations were corroborated by our results. Preliminary 
analysis shows that in our setting, once a buyer releases his private information, the 
negotiations were closed immediately in almost all cases. It is noteworthy that the buyer’s 
disclosure of information was usually accompanied by a fair counter offer (usually the one 
splitting the cake in equal parts). These ideas indicate that buyers used their private 
information to provide the sellers with some assurance regarding the fairness of the buyer’s 
counteroffers. Complimentary research is needed in order to demonstrate this matter.  
Finally, our results regarding the influence of bargaining power and delay costs on buyer’s 
willingness to share information were somehow conditioned by the bargaining task used in 
the experiment. In the employed bargaining task, the seller submitted the first offer of the 
negotiation to the buyer. Since the power position of buyers influenced negatively the first 
offer, in many cases the buyers received offers that they found optimal to accept. In this 
cases (around 50% of the negotiations), negotiations were closed in the first round, 
eliminating any chance for sharing information in subsequent periods. Further research may 
analyze if other bargaining tasks (for example, one in which the buyer submits the first 
offer in the negotiation or one in which the seller still submitting the first offer but the 
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buyer have the chance to transmit information prior to it) may enhance the more powerful 
buyer’s incentives to share private information, maybe to the point of observing a positive 
relation between bargaining power and private accounting information sharing.  
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